# research note

# Why Non-Competitive States are So Important for Understanding the Outcomes of Competitive Elections: The Electoral College 1868-2016\*

POSSIBLE NAME CHANGE: (R)ED IS FOR REPUBLICAN: Why Non-Competitive States are So Important for Understanding the Outcomes of Competitive Elections

BG, don’t know if we can change the title at this stage, but something more catchy might help get more citations (and less boring!).

# Why Noncompetitive States are So Important for Understanding the Outcomes of Competitive Elections: The Electoral College 1868-2016

# ABSTRACT

*Brams and Kilgour (2017) begin their recent essay on the Electoral College by pointing out the obvious, but nonetheless regularly neglected, fact that states that are non-competitive may have a decisive impact on Electoral College (EC) outcomes and shape the electoral strategies of the candidates in the competitive states, especially if there is asymmetry in the partisan balance in the non-competitive states. Their contribution is to offer combinatorics insights into the implications of such asymmetries in the form of three new indicators: Winningness, Vulnerability, and Fragility. They then explore the magnitude and effects of these three measures for the presidential elections of 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. One contribution of this note is to extend their analyses of these measures to an additional 34 elections: every election in the modern two-party post-Civil War era from 1868 through 2016. We find the Winningness measure to predict very well over the entire set of 38 presidential elections. Inspired by their work, we also offer a new and simpler metric for partisan asymmetries in noncompetitive states and show how it can predict the expected closeness of EC outcomes as well or better than the more complex combinatorics measures they propose.*

**Keywords: Electoral College; Non-Competitive States; Voting Power; Presidential Elections**

On the Sunday before election day, Donald Trump visited five states; Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Michigan. Four of the five states ended up the four closed states as measured by the two-party vote margin. Horse-race style coverage of presidential elections by talking heads of cable television banter about red and blue America while candidates venture to and fro purple states in a disparate attempt to woe “moderate” swing voters in the most pivotal of states. CNN has invested lots of money developing technology that allow interactive data and historical comparisons through touchscreen equipped monitors (John King’s magic wall) with the explicit purpose of understanding the geographical context of elections. The race to 270 creates limited paths to victory, which media heads help citizens visualize with these maps. Red/Blue America is now fully part of our vernacular, with purple indicating swing, moderate, or battleground. Wolf Blizer quipped to Jake Tapper on election night that “Jake, another presidential race where all eyes right now are on Florida”, to which Jake responded “It's one of the critical states in this race. Donald Trump himself has said he doesn't see a path to the presidency for himself without the state of Florida, the 29 electoral votes.” He further said, “the Clinton campaign knows they need Florida. They have been saying for some time they feel better about Florida than they do about states such as North Carolina, states such as Ohio or an Iowa.” And they turned out to be correct, with Florida following Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as Clinton’s most narrow loses. Institutional rules create predictable incentives. Campaigns often follow deeply rational strategies that help propel them towards 270 electors. The Electoral College (EC) is often criticized because the logic of campaigning under the EC’s weighted voting rule makes each party’s presidential campaign focus exclusively on *battleground states*, i.e., states characterized as competitive (Shaw 1999; 2006; Abramowitz 2001; Fair 2009). Such states can, over the course of a campaign, “swing” toward one candidate or the other. Often such states are taken, at least implicitly, to be the ones determinative of the presidential winner, with the largest of the battleground states in terms of EC votes seen as especially critical. Citizens in the large metropolitan cities in these battlegrounds are subjected to increased traffic caused by extra security, yet are given this privilege of access to the candidates, one of which will soon achieve the highest office in the world. Worried citizens who feel ignored by the candidates because they live in solidly red or blue states urge for electoral reform, substituting the Electoral College for a popular vote. As the polls closed on the eastern seaboard (and no returns from the day yet reported) on election night in 2016, CNN could project that Trump had won the electoral votes in Kentucky, and Indiana, and Clinton in Vermont. In this same segment, Blitzer said after another projection that “West Virginia [is] not a surprise but we're waiting for Ohio and North Carolina.”

While not surprising, these non-competitive states play an important role in shaping outcomes. We extend the argument elegantly espoused by Brams and Kilgour (2017) formalizing this point. Battleground states might get the clear majority of campaign appearances, the non-competitive states help shape the strategies a campaign might employ by establishing paths to victory.

The framers of the Constitution didn’t expect competition to be constrained between just two parties, and probably didn’t expect candidates to focus only on a subset (Miller 2012). The early political science literature on campaign strategies claimed that the most populous states would receive the bulk of campaign activities, roughly proportional to 3/2 of the electoral votes of each state (Brams and Davis 1974; Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook 1975). Scholarship since then has suggested that campaigns adopt strategies that instead maximize the probability of victory by accounting for the likelihood of victory based on pre-election polls (or betting markets) and their underling uncertainty (Stromberg 2008, Fair 2009). Using theoretical concepts of power and pivoting first introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1954), Wright (2009) shows that while tendency of a state to be pivotal (ie, their votes take a candidate from losing to winning, when ranked by margin of victory) is mostly determined by population size and bellwether tendencies, small and medium states can also be pivotal and competitiveness is “neither a necessary nor sufficient condition”. A more recent view, made possible by a tremendous data collection effort, Shaw and Althaus (forthcoming) show that competitiveness is only “imperfectly correlated” with battleground status and that state population is no longer a predictor of where a campaign spends resources. Campaigns might even strategically target smaller, less populous states, largely because advertising costs are lower in rural areas and smaller states receive proportionally more Electoral College votes due to the two-seat Senate bonus **(CITE, BG can we cite our unpublished work on this?).**

If elections are indeed determined by the battleground states, a large majority of states have seemingly no power to determine the president, since, for all practical purposes, the outcomes in those states cannot be changed by the presidential campaign. It is also well known that, because of the horse-race nature of election coverage, it is the potentially pivotal states that get all the attention from the media (Lipsitz 2005). This increased exposure can lead to a positive impact on interest and engagement of politics, with benefits bestowed especially on low-income individuals (Gimpel, Kaufmann, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2007; Lipsitz and Teigen 2010). Some studies have claimed that the number of battlegrounds has narrowed (Gimpel, Kaufmann, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2007), others claim that the over-time differences are marginal (Shaw and Althaus forthcoming). Indeed, by our measure (described below), the relative value of the electors in competitive states has not significantly decreased and has averaged around 27% of the total electors.

The view that the states which are non-competitive are therefore made irrelevant has been challenged by Brams and Kilgour (2017).[[1]](#footnote-1) These authors point out that each candidate’s electoral votes can be thought of as coming from two sources: non-competitive states—with outcomes effectively decided before the election—and the competitive states that support him or her on election day. Thus, the readily foreseeable outcomes in non-competitive states can create a “loading of the dice” in an election, by requiring the candidate with fewer expected easy victories to do remarkably well in the more competitive states in order to win.[[2]](#footnote-2) Indeed, at the extreme, we can imagine the outcomes in states essentially safe for one party might involve enough votes so as to render outcomes in the more competitive states the ones that are irrelevant. [[3]](#footnote-3)

Brams and Kilgour specify an indicator, *Winningness*, of the extent to which the virtually certain outcomes in non-competitive states structure the expected outcome of the overall election in a two-candidate contest. If we, for simplicity, posit that each of the battleground states is equally likely to go for either candidate, and there are *m* such states, then *Winningness* is the proportion of the 2*m* combinations of zeroes and ones in which the candidate who is ahead in the non-competitive states is the winner (adding the seats won in competitive states found in that particular combination to the already “known” votes in the non-competitive states). The *Winningness* value for the Democratic candidate is simply one minus the *Winningnes*s value for the Republican candidate.

Note that the greater the advantage a given candidate has in the non-competitive states, the greater will be the expected proportion of the 2*m* outcomes in which that candidate is the winner of an Electoral College majority, since the candidate ahead in seats won in non-competitive states will need fewer seats won from the competitive seats to amass a winning majority than will the other candidate. For example, in 2012, with *m=*8 competitive states, under the equiprobability assumption, Brams and Kilgour point out (2017: 101) that 207 (80.9%) of the 256 splits would result in a win for Obama, whereas only 49 (19.1%) would result in a win for Romney, giving Obama 4.22 times more ways of winning than Romney.”

Brams and Kilgour (2017: 101-2) offer two other closely linked indicators that can be used to measure the extent to which outcomes are predictable: *Vulnerability* and *Fragility*. *Vulnerability* is defined as “the proportion of the coalitions in competitive states in which a single competitive state, by switching to the other candidate, either can cause a change in the winner or create a tie …;” while “*Fragility* is measured by the expected number of competitive states in a winning coalition that can disrupt victory in this way.” Both of the latter measures are well defined only for those election years in which no candidate has a large enough EC seat share in the non-competitive seats to constitute a majority of the Electoral College. Also each must be calculated separately for each party. *Winningness* is defined for all elections.

Brams and Kilgour, using a definition of *non-competitive state* as one where the winner’s vote share in a two-party race is expected to be above 53%[[4]](#footnote-4), calculate *Winningness*, *Vulnerability*, and *Fragility* for four recent elections: 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. We extend their analysis to include all 38 presidential elections in the modern two-party era, from 1868-2016. Table AI in the on-line Appendix reports the results of our calculations. [[5]](#footnote-5)

Over this entire period, as commonsense would predict, when *Winningness* is high, *Vulnerability* and *Fragility* are both low (with correlations ranging from -0.88 to -0.98), while the correlations between the latter two variables are highly positive (ranging from 0.80 to 0.91). See Table I. The Pearson correlations reported in Table I involving *Vulnerability* and *Fragility* are only for the elections where outcomes can be effected by what happens in the competitive states. [[6]](#footnote-6)

**<<Table I about here>>**

In the online Appendix, we consider how analyses would change if we changed the definition of non-competitive state.While the analyses in the Appendix show that our choice of range to define a competitive state can matter somewhat, to maximize our compatibility with Brams and Kilgour (2017), and because we think this definition is a plausible one in the context of predicting EC outcomes (see discussion below), we will use the Brams and Kilgour (2017) plus or minus three percentage point definition of competitive state throughout the essay.

In the next section, we consider how well each of the three measures (and all three together) allow us to predict EC winners and EC seat shares in these 38 elections. Then we discuss the question of how well an *ex post* measure of non-competitive states relates to expectations about non-competitiveness *ex ante*. In the subsequent section, we offer a simple alternative measure based on the Brams and Kilgour intuition about the importance of the imbalance in partisan breakdown of EC seat shares in the non-competitive states. We show that this measure, that we label *Non-Competitive Advantage*, is as predictive of the final EC outcomes and somewhat more predictive of final EC seat percentages than any of the measures proposed by Brams and Kilgour (2017). In sum, we find both Winningness and non-Competitive Advantage to perform very well.

***Winningness*, *Vulnerability*, and *Fragility: 1868-2016***

While the various measures proposed by Brams and Kilgour (2017) are of theoretical interest, in and of themselves, we are most interested in how these measures allow us to address the bias imposed on likely Electoral College outcomes of having a substantial proportion of seat outcomes already known in advance in a fashion that favors one political party. Brams and Kilgour note (2017: 111) that the sign on the *Winningness* advantage correctly predicts the winners in all four of the presidential contests they study. When we replicate that analysis for all 38 elections, we find that this holds for all but two elections: 1880 and 1960. This is a very good predictive performance by the *Winningnes*s variable. Even if we consider just the 17 elections where the winner was determined by the competitive states, this is a success rate of 88%.[[7]](#footnote-7)

A more difficult test for the predictive usefulness of *Winningness* and the other two variables is to ask how well they, singly or collectively*,* predict final EC seat share outcomes. Figure I plots *Winningness*, *Vulnerability*, and *Fragility* against EC final seat share. These three variables are, in fact, highly correlated with EC outcomes, with the correlation for *Winningness* at 0.90, that for Republican (Democratic) *Fragility* at -0.76 (-0.67), while that Republican (Democratic) *Vulnerability* is -0.66 (-0.81). [[8]](#footnote-8)

**<< Figure I about here>>**

We also see from the first plot in Figure I that in most years, *Winningness* is such that the outcome is expected to be determined solely by what happens in the non-competitive states, i.e., a *Winningness* values of zero or one. In the four elections analyzed in Brams and Kilgour (2017), only one, 2008, fell into this category. Had Brams and Kilgour extended their data back somewhat further in time to 1980, however, they would have found that in that election and in each of the four following elections, one of the two candidates had locked up enough votes in non-competitive states to win the election.[[9]](#footnote-9)

We have done regression analyses with all three Brams-Kilgour measures as independent variables and EC Democratic share as the dependent variable, but we do not report results for these regressions since, as expected, the very high correlations among the three variables meant that adding *Vulnerability* and/or *Fragility* to *Winningness* did not increase the adjusted R2, and only one of the three variables was statistically significant in any of the models. Also, when we include *Vulnerability*, and *Fragility,* we require separate equations for each party, and we lose cases. For the 38-election time-period, we find that the best fitting model in terms of adjusted R2 is the simple bivariate regression where we use *Winningness* aloneto predict the EC outcome, with an adjusted R2 value of 0.81 (see Table AII).

**Accuracy of ex post classification of states as non-competitive**

B-K first justify the use of the *ex-post* criterion by which they classify competitive and non-competitive states by pointing out that ±3% corresponds with the usual pre-election poll margin of error.[[10]](#footnote-10) Second, they point out that, empirically, there is a very good fit between *ex ante* and *ex post* evaluations of competitive states.[[11]](#footnote-11) For example, in 2012, B-K note that 99.6% of advertising money was spent in the ten states identified as battlegrounds by FairVote.org. Of those ten states, eight are included in the *post hoc* set of competitive states, while the other two were the next closest states in terms of margin of victory. In 2012, 87% of campaign events were held in the set 8 states viewed post-hoc as competitive.[[12]](#footnote-12) Additionally, pre-election polls available to campaigns do a good job of predicting final outcomes (Soumbatiants et al 2006). There are good theoretical reasons to expect that ex-ante measures of competitiveness will be closely aligned with pre-election expectations. First, states with disproportionate support from partisans of one party are the most unlikely to swing to the other party. Second, the battleground states are essential to both parties. The trailing candidate *must* win the battleground regardless of the non-competitive deficient they have. A leading candidate would target the battlegrounds especially if they are needed to reach 270, but even if their Non-Competitive Advantage is such that the battlegrounds are not pivot, they represent the set of states that are most vulnerable and thus the most likely target.

We provide confirmation of the congruence between post-hoc measures of competitiveness and ex ante expectations of competitiveness for two additional recent elections, those in 2004 and in 2016.[[13]](#footnote-13) In the 2016 election, the campaigns and campaign related PACs spent 82% of advertising money in the states retrospectively classified as competitive.[[14]](#footnote-14) Moreover, the only competitive state not targeted by either campaign was Minnesota, a state that holds the longest win streak for Democratic candidates. Similarly, if we look at candidate rallies or events where the presidential or vice-presidential candidate was present in 2016, the major party candidates held 79% of all events in the 13 states which post-hoc we are labeling competitive. A similar pattern occurs in 2004, when 85% of campaign events were held in the 12 competitive states (Shaw 2006)**.** However,we would not, in general, expect the campaign spending or campaign appearances to be only in competitive states, since candidates also spend some money and make some appearances for reasons not directly related to boosting their own campaign chances, e.g., to help down-ticket candidates or to build for the future. [[15]](#footnote-15) We might also consider that trailing candidates must sometimes campaign in non-competititve states held by the opposing party. The logic is that if there are not enough battleground states to deliver the requisite 270, the paths to victory include switching the not competitive states as well as the battlegrounds. A trailing candidate might also want to expand the pathways to victory by turning some of these states. Stromberg (2008) offers a thorough evaluation of campaign strategies for trailing candidates by suggesting a hockey metaphor; as a game winds down, a trailing team looking to increase the probability of tying the game pulls their goalie to provide more offensive potential, taking the risk of giving up another goal. A leading team would like to protect their lead, replacing offensive players with defensively skilled players.

Post-hoc definitions of competitiveness might also mask when candidates outperform (under-preform) expectations. For instance, imagine that a state is contested by both candidates, but on election day *Candidate A* sees a uniform 5% increase across all states. A state that would have been 50-50 is now 55-45 and classified as non-competitive. A trailing candidate must win more than just the battlegrounds if their safe states’ EC votes added to all the battleground doesn’t equal 270. To address this, we consider Shaw and Althaus’ (forthcoming) battleground classification scheme, which uses actual campaign strategies to develop a list of battlegrounds *actually contested*. **RESULTS HERE OR IN APPENDIX.**

**Using Partisan Imbalance in Non-Competitive States to Predict EC Outcomes**

We, like Brams and Kilgour (2017), believe that outcomes in non-competitive states are critical in understanding final Electoral College winners. In this section, we capitalize on that insight by offering a simple measure that we show jointly performs as well or better as than Brams-Kilgour variables in predicting final EC outcomes.

To present our measure, some notation is useful. We may again partition the states into the set of competitive states, Cj,and the set of non-competitive states, NCi, where *i* indicates the election year. The EC seats in a competitive state are labeled as s(Cj) and the EC seats in a non-competitive state are labeled as s(NCj). We have s(EC) = s(Cj) + s(NCj). The noncompetitive states won by Democrats we label NCD, and the non-competitive states won by Democrats we label NCR. The seats in the non-competitive states won by the Democrats are thus labeled s(NCD) and the seats in the non-competitive states won by Republicans are thus labeled s(NCR).

We will be interested, on the one hand, on the partisan balance of seats in the non-competitive states and, on the other hand, on the share of the states that fall into the non-competitive category. We define our variable of interest as the difference between the two-candidate’s non-competitive electoral totals, divided by the total number of EC seats

***Non-Competitive Advantage* = [s(NCD) - s(NCR)]/s(EC)**

This measure is standardized, thus allowing us to compare its effects across elections. When one party has a big advantage in non-competitive electoral votes, they will be more likely to win the election. Bram's and Kilgour reflect this intuition by examining coalitions among competitive states, and determining outcomes under the explicit assumptions that the competitive state outcomes occur independently of one another and with an equal probability of victory for the two parties in each. [[16]](#footnote-16) We do not require either of these strong assumptions. But exactly the same intuition drives our model as that in the work of Brams and Kilgour, namely that the candidate that has a bigger advantage in electors from the non-competitive states will have more options in terms of possible wins in competitive states leading to Electoral College victory.

Table II shows *ex post* values for the Democratic and Republican EC seat shares in the non-competitive states in the first two columns, and it also shows the final EC seat outcome both as a number and as a percentage. In addition, we provide a column that has the *difference* between the Democratic and Republican EC seats in the noncompetitive states, and a further column that shows that difference normalized by total EC seats, i.e. a column that shows *Non-Competitive Advantage*. [[17]](#footnote-17)

**<<Table II about here>>**

We first test the predictive usefulness of our *Non-Competitive Advantage* variable by looking to see how often the party with the advantage in the non-competitive states wins the EC vote. As does the *Winningness* measure, in all four of the elections from 2000 through 2012, *Non-Competitive Advantage* correctly predicts the presidential outcome. Indeed, we find that in all but 2 of the 38 elections (1880 and 1960) the party with a *Non-Competitive Advantage* goes on to win the election, the same strong predictive accuracy as the Winningness measures. Interestingly, the two election errors are the same two elections that *Winningness* fails to predict.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Next, we regress Republican EC seat share on the *Non-Competitive Advantage* variable*.* Here we find (see Table AII) a very strong and significant relationship between the two measures, and the simple regression between them yields an adjusted R2 of 0.96. We can compare this regression with one that models the same dependent variable with *Winningness* as the predictive variable. As noted earlier, the adjusted R2 of the *Winningness* model is 0.806, lower than that for *Non-Competitive Advantage* at 0.958. Whilethe very simple *Non-Competitive Advantage* variable does better in predicting final seat shares than any (or all) of the three variables from Brams-Kilgour (2017), *Winningness* and *Non-Competitive Advantage* do equally was well at predicting the directionality of EC outcomes.

# **Discussion**


Brams and Kilgour (2017) begin by suggesting that the set-up power of non-competitive states dictate the terms under which a presidential election is contested. We agree. While competitive states receive the bulk of campaign activities like television and radio advertising, campaign field offices, and visits from the candidates and their surrogates, the media “horse-race” coverage about ‘swing states’ and ‘battleground states’ takes attention away from the extent to which safe seats matter for election outcomes. Partisan balance in non-competitive states matters since the candidate who enjoys a *Non-Competitive Advantage* has many additional pathways to the presidency, and thus one candidate can begin the presidential contest severely handicapped.

We have extended B-K’s analyses of *Winningness*, *Vulnerability* and *Fragility* beyond the four recent elections they analyze, to include not just 2016, but all elections between 1868 and 2016. Thus, we have added 34 elections to the analyses. We also added a new and simpler variable based on the logic of the B-K argument, namely, *Non-Competitive Advantage,* defined as the difference in safe EC seats between the parties, normalized by total EC seats. We find that the candidate that holds the edge in *Winningness* and *Non-Competitive Advantage* have gone on to win in all but 2 of the 38 elections since 1868. In the mispredicted elections, the partisan advantage in non-competitive seats was very slim. When we move from attempting to predict a dichotomous outcome variable to seeking to predict final EC vote shares, we found that both *Winningness* and our new *Non-Competitive Advantage* variable are highly predictive of EC seat shares, but now the predictive edge is with the simpler variable **(**R2 of 0.96 vs. one of 0.81).


In toto, we take these results to be highly supportive of the basic B-K intuition: Campaigns have clear incentives to concentrate resources in the most competitive states, but non-competitive states play a foundational role in setting up the contest and, as we have shown, the more potential paths to victory the greater the expected seat share, and the candidate who has the edge in the Non-Competitive EC seats is almost always elected President. In recognizing that the parties build coalitions of support that result in trends such that states tend towards certain parties, we can look at classify support during these cycles. We adopt five cycle periods that reflect changing cleavages in American history; 1868-1892, 1896-1928, 1932-1964, 1968-1988, and 1992-present. The measure we develop is a summary measure which averages how often a state is competitive or leaning for each party over the cycle. States that are not-competitive for one party at least 50% of the time for one party is classified as “Strong”, while “Battlegrounds” are those which are competitive at least 50% of the time. All others are “Leaning” towards whichever party they support most often. Strong Democratic states are coded as (-2) while Strong Republican are (2), with Battlegrounds equal to zero. We then average across each period to show which party has been advantaged in each period.[[19]](#footnote-19) Not surprisingly, the Democrats hard a large advantage in the New Deal era (-1.02), while the Republicans enjoyed an advantage after the Civil Rights movement (1.05). The post-Civil War period as the most balanced period (0.05), followed closely by the current period (-0.22). Furthermore, the percentage of states that are battlegrounds over 50% of the time is essentially unchanged in the current period as compared to 1964-1988 at around 20%, but is substantially higher than it was 1896-1964 (When presidential elections were dominated by one party or the other). One worrying sign is that only 57% of states in the current period have been competitive at least once. The previous low was the post-Civil War period at 68%. The average proportion of EC votes, however, has shown almost no decline but with a much lower standard deviation, indicating fewer years with low competitive EC votes (but also fewer with lots of competitive EC votes) It’s no surprise that the most closely fought elections happen during this time-period, including all the popular vote reversals. Given the current political map and the relative number of battlegrounds, we expect the 2020 presidential election to continue the pattern of close elections in which the proportion of non-competitive EC votes to remain remarkably even.

**Potential graph to add:**

**Proportion of Competitive States, 1868-2016**

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**OR, AS PERTAINING TO THE CONSISTANT SUPPORT FROM STATES:**

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**RED IS SOLID REPUBILCAN, BLUE IS SOLID DEMOCRAT. WE COULD ALSO WRITE MORE ABOUT THE FIRST AND LAST PERIOD WHICH ARE THE TIMES IN WHICH THE NATION HAS HAD THE CLOSEST ELECTIONS. REPUBLICANS HAD A SLIGHT EDGE IN NON-COMPETTIVE IN THE FIRST AND WON SLIGHTLY MORE ELECTIONS (I THINK), AND DEMS HAD SLIGHTLY MORE NON-COMPETITIVE IN THIS PERIOD, CLEARLY WINNING MORE (4/7).**

BG, CAN YOU WRITE A BIT ABOUT HOW THIS FITS INTO THE PUBLIC CHOICE LITERATURE AS KEITH HAS ASKED? AS PER MY DINNER CONVERSATION WITH KEITH, I’M NOT COMPLETELY SURE WHAT EXACTLY PUBLIC CHOICE IS.

**Figure I: Comparing Winningness, Vulnerability, and Fragility to EC Outcomes**

**/Users/jcervas/Dropbox/Non Competitive Electors/scatterBrams.pdf**

NOTE:Candidate’s Share of EC is from the Republican perspective in plot one. The Candidate’s Share of the EC is labeled “D” for the Democratic candidate, and “R” for the Republican candidate in the *Vulnerability* and *Fragility* plots.

**Table I**

**a. Correlations among the *Winningness*, *Vulnerability*, and *Fragility* variables for the Republican and Democratic Parties and with Republican EC seat share: 1868-2016**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Democratic Party Correlations** | | | | | |  | **Winningness** | **Vulnerability** | **Fragility** | **EC Outcome**  **(DEM)** | | **Winningness** | 1 | -0.957 | -0.981 | 0.901 | | **Vulnerability** | -0.957 | 1 | 0.910 | -0.855 | | **Fragility** | -0.981 | 0.910 | 1 | -0.718 | | **EC Outcome** | 0.901 | -0.855 | -0.718 | 1 | |
| |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Republican Party Correlations** | | | | | |  | **Winningness** | **Vulnerability** | **Fragility** | **EC Outcome**  **(REP)** | | **Winningness** | 1 | -0.978 | -0.876 | 0.901 | | **Vulnerability** | -0.978 | 1 | 0.804 | -0.883 | | **Fragility** | -0.876 | 0.804 | 1 | -0.774 | | **EC Outcome** | 0.901 | -0.883 | -0.774 | 1 | |

**NOTE: *Winningness* defined for all elections. *Vulnerability* and *Fragility* only defined for 24/38 elections for the Democratic candidate, and for 31/38 for the Republican candidate.**

**Table I (cont.)**

**b. Correlations among the *Winningness*, *Vulnerability*, and *Fragility* [Restricted Models]: 1868-2016**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Democratic Party Correlations [Restricted Model]** | | | | |
|  | **Winningness** | **Vulnerability** | **Fragility** | **EC Outcome**  **(DEM)** |
| **Winningness** | 1 | -0.947 | -0.973 | 0.726 |
| **Vulnerability** | -0.947 | 1 | 0.886 | -0.807 |
| **Fragility** | -0.973 | 0.886 | 1 | -0.667 |
| **EC Outcome** | 0.726 | -0.807 | -0.667 | 1 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Republican Party Correlations [Restricted Model]** | | | | |
|  | **Winningness** | **Vulnerability** | **Fragility** | **EC Outcome**  **(REP)** |
| **Winningness** | 1 | -0.964 | -0.810 | 0.726 |
| **Vulnerability** | -0.964 | 1 | 0.705 | -0.658 |
| **Fragility** | -0.810 | 0.705 | 1 | -0.759 |
| **EC Outcome** | 0.726 | -0.658 | -0.759 | 1 |

NOTE: Restricted values are defined only on the elections in which *Winningness* is neither 0 or 1 (17 of 38). *Vulnerability* and *Fragility* took value 0 in Table Ia when *Winningness* is 1 since the candidate who wins all the coalitions cannot be vulnerable or have fragile coalitions. Here, only elections which were decided by competitive states are used to calculate the Pearson Pairwise Correlations.

**Table II: Electoral College Data for Calculation of *Non-Competitive Advantage*, 1868-2016**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Non-Competitive  EC Seats | | |  | | --- | | Electoral College Outcomes | | |  |  | | --- | --- | | Seats | Percent | | | | | | Differences | |
|  | Rep | Dem | Rep | Dem | Rep | Dem | Seats | Percent |
| 1868 | 153 | 37 | 211 | 80 | 0.725 | 0.275 | 116 | 0.399 |
| 1872 | 269 | 34 | 300 | 66 | 0.82 | 0.18 | 235 | 0.642 |
| 1876 | 64 | 119 | 182 | 184 | 0.497 | 0.503 | -55 | -0.15 |
| 1880 | 95 | 125 | 213 | 156 | 0.577 | 0.423 | -30 | -0.081 |
| 1884 | 93 | 123 | 182 | 219 | 0.454 | 0.546 | -30 | -0.075 |
| 1888 | 112 | 100 | 233 | 168 | 0.581 | 0.419 | 12 | 0.03 |
| 1892 | 112 | 150 | 173 | 271 | 0.39 | 0.61 | -38 | -0.086 |
| 1896 | 203 | 126 | 273 | 174 | 0.611 | 0.389 | 77 | 0.172 |
| 1900 | 258 | 122 | 292 | 155 | 0.653 | 0.347 | 136 | 0.304 |
| 1904 | 317 | 120 | 343 | 133 | 0.721 | 0.279 | 197 | 0.414 |
| 1908 | 283 | 120 | 327 | 156 | 0.677 | 0.323 | 163 | 0.337 |
| 1912 | 8 | 467 | 23 | 508 | 0.043 | 0.957 | -459 | -0.864 |
| 1916 | 171 | 213 | 255 | 276 | 0.48 | 0.52 | -42 | -0.079 |
| 1920 | 382 | 114 | 404 | 127 | 0.761 | 0.239 | 268 | 0.505 |
| 1924 | 366 | 136 | 395 | 136 | 0.744 | 0.256 | 230 | 0.433 |
| 1928 | 379 | 52 | 444 | 87 | 0.836 | 0.164 | 327 | 0.616 |
| 1932 | 8 | 413 | 59 | 472 | 0.111 | 0.889 | -405 | -0.763 |
| 1936 | 8 | 519 | 8 | 523 | 0.015 | 0.985 | -511 | -0.962 |
| 1940 | 27 | 290 | 82 | 449 | 0.154 | 0.846 | -263 | -0.495 |
| 1944 | 31 | 215 | 99 | 432 | 0.186 | 0.814 | -184 | -0.347 |
| 1948 | 37 | 215 | 200 | 331 | 0.377 | 0.623 | -178 | -0.335 |
| 1952 | 379 | 53 | 442 | 89 | 0.832 | 0.168 | 326 | 0.614 |
| 1956 | 446 | 47 | 457 | 74 | 0.861 | 0.139 | 399 | 0.751 |
| 1960 | 132 | 86 | 220 | 317 | 0.41 | 0.59 | 46 | 0.086 |
| 1964 | 47 | 463 | 52 | 486 | 0.097 | 0.903 | -416 | -0.773 |
| 1968 | 175 | 94 | 320 | 218 | 0.595 | 0.405 | 81 | 0.151 |
| 1972 | 511 | 17 | 521 | 17 | 0.968 | 0.032 | 494 | 0.918 |
| 1976 | 66 | 114 | 241 | 297 | 0.448 | 0.552 | -48 | -0.089 |
| 1980 | 344 | 19 | 489 | 49 | 0.909 | 0.091 | 325 | 0.604 |
| 1984 | 498 | 3 | 525 | 13 | 0.976 | 0.024 | 495 | 0.92 |
| 1988 | 289 | 42 | 426 | 112 | 0.792 | 0.208 | 247 | 0.459 |
| 1992 | 73 | 263 | 168 | 370 | 0.312 | 0.688 | -190 | -0.353 |
| 1996 | 66 | 348 | 159 | 379 | 0.296 | 0.704 | -282 | -0.524 |
| 2000 | 189 | 171 | 271 | 267 | 0.504 | 0.496 | 18 | 0.033 |
| 2004 | 213 | 183 | 286 | 252 | 0.532 | 0.468 | 30 | 0.056 |
| 2008 | 145 | 291 | 174 | 364 | 0.323 | 0.677 | -146 | -0.271 |
| 2012 | 191 | 233 | 206 | 332 | 0.383 | 0.617 | -42 | -0.078 |
| 2016 | 188 | 187 | 305 | 233 | 0.567 | 0.433 | 1 | 0.002 |

**NOTE: Competitive states are determined by the winning party garnering no more than 53% of the two-party vote.**

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1. We will refer to Brams and Kilgour’s *Electoral Studies* paper by their names and with the B-K acronym interchangeably throughout this essay. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For example, in 2012, Brams and Kilgour point out (p. 101): “Because Barack Obama had a 233–191 electoral vote lead over Mitt Romney in the 42 noncompetitive states and the District of Columbia, he needed only 37 of the 114 electoral votes in the competitive states to win with a majority of 270 electoral votes, whereas Romney needed 79.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In 1984, Ronald Reagan won 49 out of 51 states (including Washington D.C.) Norman Ornstein, writing before the election, said “Incumbent presidents don’t often lose, particularly presidents presiding over 6% real growth and low or non-existent inflation” (quoted in *CQ Press*, http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1984091400). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. In races with third parties, a margin of victory no greater than 6%. For the purposes of this note, we concern ourselves only with the two highest vote earners and calculate accordingly. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. In the process of replicating the Brams and Kilgour (2017) analyses, we found a few minor errors that we corrected; those corrections explain the differences in the numbers reported in Table AI for the elections of 2000 and 2004**,** and those reported in Brams and Kilgour Table 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In Table Ia, *Vulnerability* and *Fragility* are defined in all elections that are competitive (17/38), and because the sample is split for Republicans and Democrats, for years in which that candidate had a *Winningness* of 1 (*Vulnerability* and *Fragility* are always zero in these cases). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. While these two elections were very close in two-party vote margin, and thus might be regarded as hard to predict, they were less so electorally. In 1960, John F. Kennedy won the EC vote by 9.1% and in 1880, James Garfield won by 7.5%. In neither election were third party candidacies consequential in affecting relative two party shares. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Because of the frequent occurrence of values of 0 or 1, a perfect linear fit is impossible**.**  [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. In 1992, Bill Clinton was just 7 shy of having enough seats in non-competitive states, and could have lost the election in only 5 of the over 130,000 different combinations of electoral outcomes among the competitive states, i.e., Winningness > 0.99. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. When a state polls outside this three percentage point margin, it is generally seen as not winnable by the trailing candidate, although more errors in prediction do occur than would be suggested by the 95% confidence limits **(**Gelman and King 1993; Shirani-Mehr et al., forthcoming). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. A third reason for choosing the ±3% value is a pragmatic one that we found only after we had done robustness checks; over both recent elections and the longer historical data ±3% value t has (marginally) greater predictive power than the often used ±5% definition of competitive state (see Appendix). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Data aggregated from FairVote.org, with original data from CNN: <http://www.fairvote.org/presidential_tracker_2012#2012_campaign_events> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Older elections also largely conform to these expectations. Detailed campaign activities for the 1976 election are available because they were submitted into evidence for the hearingbefore the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary (S.J. Res. 28,1979) on a bill that would abolish the ElectoralCollege and establish a direct popular vote. The data were first used by Bartels (1985). That election shows a similar pattern of campaign activities focused on the competitive states, though there were many more (25) competitive states in 1976 than in the two most recent elections of 2012 and 2016. In 1976, 78% of all campaign events were held in the 25 battleground states, and 78% of all campaign television and radio ads were held there. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Data compiled from AdAge.com, based on state specific ad buys between October 21, 2016 and election day. <http://adage.com/article/campaign-trail/states-where-trump-clinton-spending-most-on-advertising/306377/> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Bartels (1985) has pointed out that campaigns have what he calls both “instrumental” and “ornamental” reasons for staging campaign events. Attending an event in a swing state, where a candidate’s presence could increase turnout is instrumental, while visiting a state to satisfy state parties might be ornamental.Clinton spent over $600,000 in Arizona, perhaps trying to influence lower ticket races by increasing mobilization efforts. Ultimately, Arizona, a state that has had a strong Republican tradition, became competitive in 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. We regard both of these assumptions as quite reasonable ones to make for purposes of model tractability, but we might expect that they would be falsified if there are electoral tides that sweep in a particular direction and thus create interdependencies in vote outcomes in the competitive states. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Minor party candidacies likely to be a problem for our analyses in situations where they receive Electoral College votes. This has not been the case in recent elections, as no minor party candidate has won a state since George Wallace in 1968. In their assessment of minor party impact, Pattie and Johnson (2014) do not find substantial effects and they also note that such effects have often been split in their partisan impact. To provide a consistent coding across all elections in our data set we ignore minor party votes and treat contests as between the two major party candidates in terms of two party vote share. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See footnote 5**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. We employ a weighted average based on the average number of EC votes each state gets during this period. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)